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THE NECESSITY OF CONFERRING A BENEFIT FOR RECOVERY IN QUASI-CONTRACT
In Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc.,1
the plaintiff sued for breach of a contract for the construction of
missile trailers. The plaintiff, Coleman, had submitted a bid for the
job based on its interpretation of specifications set by the defendant,
North American. The defendant's engineers filed the bid without
reading it. Coleman was then notified that it was the successful
bidder, five "go-ahead" telegrams were sent, and work was begun.
Subsequently a controversy arose over the height of the payload
center of gravity. Because of the discrepancy between the specifications and Coleman's interpretation of them, much of the work already completed had to be changed, raising the cost substantially
over the original bid price. Meetings were scheduled to negotiate a
price adjustment, but meanwhile, at the request of one of the defendant's engineers, Coleman continued working. When the parties eventually failed to agree upon a satisfactory price adjustment,
North American awarded the contract to another firm.
The majority of the court affirmed the trial court's decision that
the defendant had breached a valid contract. Chief Justice Traynor,
with Justice Mosk concurring, dissented, 2 taking the position that
some material terms were too vague and that others had been left to
future negotiation. According to the dissent, the parties had failed
to form a valid contract upon which damages could be based. 3 But
the chief justice would have granted recovery to the plaintiff on
the basis of restitution in quasi-contract. 4 Recovery on that basis
would have been contrary to the general rule in California 5 and
other jurisdictions.6 It is repeatedly stated that the basis of recovery
in restitution is the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff's expense. 7 Some benefit must be conferred upon the defendant
or he simply has not been unjustly enriched. In Coleman the plaintiff had expended some $250,000 on the construction of the trailers,
but these expenditures had neither enriched nor benefited the defendant in the usual sense because the trailers were never delivered.
1 65 Cal. 2d 396, 420 P.2d 713, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966).
2

Id. at 410, 420 P.2d at 723, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 11.

s Id. at 418, 420 P.2d at 728, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 16.

4 See id. at 420, 420 P.2d at 729, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
5 See, e.g., Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Royal Dutch Dairies, 212
Cal. App. 2d 901, 908, 28 Cal. Rptr. 448, 452 (1960); Major-Blakeney Corp. v.
Jenkins, 121 Cal. App. 2d 325, 340, 263 P.2d 655, 664 (1953).
6 See, e.g., Bogan v. Finn, 298 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1957); Henrikson v.

Henrikson, 143 Wis. 314, 324, 127 N.W. 962, 966 (1910); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 348 (1932); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 604 (1929).
7

City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 378, 393,

Cal. Rptr. 701, 711 (1961); Bellanca Corp. v. Bellanca, 53 Del. 378, 383, 169
A.2d 620, 623 (1961); Estate of Phillips, 10 Misc. 2d 714, 716, 173 N.Y.S.2d 632,
12

635 (Sur. Ct. 1958); Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 648, 209 P.2d 457, 459
(1949).
[12591

1260

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 19

Chief Justice Traynor argued that in some cases involving personal service contracts the plaintiffs have been awarded the reasonable value of their services, on a quantum meruit, without regard
Personal
to whether those services benefited the defendants.8
service contracts do not represent a universal exception to the general rule that a benefit must have been conferred upon the defendant,9 but courts have been less reluctant to grant recovery in
those cases than they have been when the services were incidental
to the construction of a finished product. 10 Traynor sees no reason
for a distinction between the two types of cases and, as in Coleman:
[W]hen two parties mistakenly believe that a contract exists between
them, but the agreement is too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced, the one rendering performance ... at the request of the other

should receive reasonable compensation therefor without regard to
benefit conferred upon the other."'
He maintains that such a rule would place the loss where it belongs,
12
i.e. on the party whose request induced performance.
The dissent in Coleman may indicate a forthcoming change in the
law in California. 3 It certainly indicates a recognition that restricting recovery in quasi-contract to only those instances involving unjust enrichment is often too harsh.
The purpose of this note is to examine the reasons why unjust
enrichment is the sole basis for recovery in quasi-contract, to explore the possibilities of broadening that basis, and to determine if a
valid reason exists for a distinction between personal service contracts and contracts for the manufacture of a finished product.
8 65 Cal. 2d at 419, 420 P.2d at 728-29, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17; see

Minsky's Follies, Inc. v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1953); Williams v.
Dougan, 175 Cal. App. 2d 414, 346 P.2d 241 (1959); Kearns v. Andree, 107
Conn. 181, 139 A. 695 (1928); People's Nat'l Bank v. Magruder, 77 Fla. 235, 81
So. 440 (1919); Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909); Abrams
v. Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962); Fabian v. Wasatch
Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 125 P. 860 (1912).
9 Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal. 2d 605, 95 P.2d 927 (1939), criticized in 28 CA=IF.
L. REv. 528 (1940); Bristol v. Sutton, 115 Mich. 365, 73 N.W. 424 (1897); cf.
Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (1913); Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky.
199, 137 S.W. 1045 (1911); Henrikson v. Henrikson, 143 Wis. 314, 127 N.W. 962
(1910).
10 Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 (1878); Anderson Forge & Mach.
Co. v. Sterling Motor Co., 201 Mich. 429, 167 N.W. 988 (1918); Manning Mfg.
Co. v. Miller Bros., 87 Vt. 455, 89 A. 479 (1914).
11 65 Cal. 2d 396, 420, 420 P.2d 713, 729, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 17 (1966).
12

Id.

See Palmer v. Gregg, 65 Cal. 2d 657, 422 P.2d 985, 56 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1967). It is significant that the court made special mention of Coleman, distinguishing it from the principal case. In Palmer the plaintiff sued for services performed for the decedent. The lower court had awarded the plaintiff
13

the cost of a gardener whom she had hired to care for her own home while
she was away caring for the decedent. The supreme court disallowed that
award, stating: "The rule espoused in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Traynor ... is inapplicable because, in contrast to the present case, the expenditures in Coleman were made at the request of the obligor North American." Id. at 661 n.1, 422 P.2d at 987 n.1, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 99 n.1.
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Historical Background

4

It has been suggested that the requirement of a benefit for restitutionary recovery is due to purely historical reasons 15 and is the
result of an accident of early development rather than sound judicial
reasoning.
The early English common law was extraordinarily conservative
with its "persistency of archaic reverence for form and of scholastic
methods of interpretation."' 6 The development of equity was necessary to fill in the gaps left by the rigid limitations within which
the law courts were operating. An injured plaintiff, unable to fit
his claim within the bounds of a specific writ, could bring the case
before a chancellor who was not 7handcuffed by "form and ...
scholastic methods of interpretation.'
Although it has been said that "[t]he law of restitution should
not lightly be presumed to be past the age of child-bearing,"' 8 it
was one of the earliest remedies granted in Chancery. 19 The first
cases did not establish the principle that restitution was based upon
the defendant's unjust enrichment. 20 As will be explained later,21
exactly when that principle became established is not clear. More
important than the principle upon which these cases were based, was
the fact that the courts were 22looking to the plaintiff's claim and not
An injured plaintiff was being reto the form of the pleading.
stored to his original position, not because the defendant had been
unjustly enriched but because the equities of the situation demanded it.
Quasi-contract, however, developed in the law courts from the
action of assumpsit. 23 As more and more plaintiffs were taking
their cases before the chancellors in order to avoid the difficulties
of the forms of pleading, and because of the necessity of proving a
quid pro quo to establish debt, the law courts began to realize that
new remedies at law were needed. Ames suggests that the jealousy
of the growing jurisdiction of the chancellors was a potent influence
in the growth and expansion of assumpsit.24 Law needed this new
form of action based on equitable principles to compete with equity.
Assumpsit was originally an action in tort but by a "natural
transition" came to be regarded as an action ex contractu.25 The
14 See generally P. WnFIEuL,

THE PROVINCE or

THE

LAw oF

ToRT

121-46

(1931) [hereinafter cited as WnIED]; Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pts.
1-2), 2 HAav. L. REv. 1, 53 (1888) [hereinafter cited as Ames].
15 28 CALIF. L. REV. 528, 530 (1940) citing Ames 53.
16 Ames 53.
17 Id.
18

R. Gorr & G. JoNEs, THE LAw OF REsTnruTiON 14 (1966).

19 See RESTATEmNT or RESTTUiON Introductory Note to pt. 1, at 5
(1937); Ames 14.
20 See Ames 14.
21 See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
22 See cases cited in Ames 14 nn. 1 & 3.
23 See W. KENE4 QUAsi-CoNTRACTS 14 (1893).
"Fairfax, J., ...
24 Ames 14, citing Y.B. 21 Edw. IV 23, pl. 6, said:
advised pleaders to pay more attention to actions on the case, and thereby
diminish the resort to Chancery."
25 Ames 15.
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"natural transition" was probably due to several factors, one of which
26
was the fact that liability in tort did not survive the wrongdoer.
At first the action could only be brought on an express promise, but
in 1603, in Slade's Case, 27 an indebitatus assumpsit was
28 allowed as a
remedy on a contract genuinely implied from the facts.
It was not without a struggle that indebitatus assumpsit was
stretched to include contracts implied by law.29 Quasi-contract, using
equitable principles, did not become established as a popular remedy
until Lord Mansfield's decision in Moses v. Macferlen3O in 1760: "If
the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice,
to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in
31
the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract ....
He goes on to say, "[t]his kind of equitable action, to recover back
money, which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and
therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money ex aequo et bono,
the defendant ought to refund ....
2
The exact limits of quasi-contract, through its early development, have been difficult to establish. 3 3 The two phrases, "natural
justice" and "ex aequo et bono" (in justice and fairness), according
to Winfield, were a source of confusion in one direction and difficult to apply in another.34 They are not clear guidelines, but it
appears that Mansfield meant that they were only to apply when the
defendant held money belonging to the plaintiff. Most cases decided after Moses v. Macferlen fit into that category.3 5 The defendant
held something of value, either money or chattels, that in equity and
good conscience belonged to the plaintiff.36 The obvious conclusion
was that quasi-contract was based on the fundamental principle that
one man ought not to be unjustly enriched at another man's expense. Two English writers have summarized the establishment of
the criterion:
Historical accident is an unsatisfactory basis for classification and,
to arrive at a satisfactory description of quasi-contract, jurists have
been forced to search for a predominant principle which will enable
them to reject a minority and unify the majority of the claims enforced by these forms of action. This principle is widely accepted
26 Id.
27 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.).
28 WINFIELD 124.
29 Id. at 125.
30 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.).
31 Id. at 678.
32 Id. at 680.
33 WINFIELD 116:
"[Tlhe limits

of quasi-contract are not so much
untraced as untraceable." See also W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACT 7 (1893).
34 WINFIELD 128.
35 See text accompanying note 37 infra.
36 One writer has noted that the English judges, because of the doctrine
of stare decisis, necessitating defined rules of law, failed to recognize natural
law completely, ". . . and so a judge was assumed to have no mandate, in
the absence of consensus or delictum, to create law. Especially must he avoid
any resort to fundamental moral principles, since these, even if they were
valid, were deemed to be beyond the scope of jurisprudence. It followed
that in quasi contract one had to be able to imply a real promise to repay
money or restore a benefit before the law would offer redress." O'Connell,
Unjust Enrichment, 5 Amv. J. Comp. L. 2, 5 (1956).
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to be Unjust Enrichment.3 7

Personal Service Contracts
The dissent in Coleman relied heavily on a small group of cases
that have disregarded the requirement of a benefit. In order to do

justice, the courts in those cases found it necessary to avoid a strict
application of the doctrine that the defendant must have been enriched.

In Williams v. Dougan s the plaintiff brought an action to

recover the reasonable value of services he had performed in caring
for animals placed in his custody by the defendant. The defendant
contended that since the animals had been left homeless by the
death of their owner and did not belong to the defendant, the plaintiff's services had conferred no benefit upon her. The court held
that the defendant's request was sufficient to imply a promise to
pay for the reasonable value of the services. As to the absence of a
benefit the court said, "[a]lthough the question of the direct benefit
flowing to the promisor is one of evidence to be considered in determining whether the law implies an agreement, it is not controlling."3 9
Treating the presence of a benefit as of evidentiary significance only is
a more rational approach to finding the proper solution for a particular case. Rather than restricting recovery to those cases in
which the requirement is met, the courts should be more flexible
by considering the presence or absence of a benefit as only one of
several determining factors. In Williams the defendant, being under no duty to care for the animals, was not benefited by having
someone else care for them, but she did request the plaintiff's services and must have known that he expected compensation for his
troubles. Had the defendant not wished to be held financially responsible she could have turned the animals over to the proper public agency. In light of all these factors the decision seems fair and
proper.
40
The Utah Supreme Court in Abrams v. Financial Service Co.

held that the prospective vendor of a house and lot could recover for
certain alterations made on the house at the defendant's request.
The contract of sale was unenforceable because the parties had
failed to obtain a Federal Housing Administration appraisal. Financial Service Co. recovered the value of its services in spite of the fact
that the improvements were made on its own property and in no way
enriched the defendant. Kearns v. Andree, 41 decided in Connecticut,
reached the same conclusion on similar facts, stating:
The basis of that [implied promise] is that the services have been
requested and have been performed by the plaintiff in the known
expectation that he would receive compensation, and neither the
extent nor the presence of benefit to the defendant from their performance is of controlling significance. 42

As in Williams, the court in Kearns recognized that no benefit existed
37

R. GoFr & G. JoNEs, supra note 18, at 4.

38 175 Cal. App. 2d 414, 346 P.2d 241 (1959).
30
40
41

42

Id. at 418, 346 P.2d at 244.
13 Utah 2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962).
107 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695 (1928).
Id. at 187, 139 A. at 697.
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but disregarded that fact and placed more importance on the request.
Professor Corbin approves of the Kearns decision.4 3 He notes that
the basis of recovery was neither damages for breach nor unjust enrichment, but just as those rules were made in older cases, when a
new and different problem arose the court was justified in extending
former remedies to fit the new situation.
An earlier Utah case, Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co.,44 took a

different approach. The defendant had orally granted to the plaintiff the exclusive right to sell the former's produce for a period of
3 years. The plaintiff made some sales but the defendant actually
lost money. It could not be said that the defendant was enriched,
but rather than disregarding the absence of a benefit the court employed the fiction that the request and the plaintiff's compliance
constituted that benefit.45 The result is proper but the use of "legal"
or "implied" benefit has been criticized. 46 The decision is given support by the Restatement of Restitution provision as to what constitutes a benefit: "A person confers a benefit upon another 4if
7 he ...
performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other."
Regardless of the method used, the above decisions illustrate the
flexibility of the judicial system 48in finding a suitable remedy that
avoids harsh or inequitable results.
Unfortunately there are cases involving personal service contracts which have adhered to the strict requirement of a benefit and,
by not allowing recovery on a quantum meruit, have placed the entire
burden upon the plaintiff. In Rotea v. Izue49 the defendant had
asked the plaintiff to perform certain services for the defendant's
sister, an invalid. The defendant had orally promised to pay for these
services out of his estate. Finding the contract unenforceable because
it did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 50 the court also denied recovery in quasi-contract because it considered that the benefit to
the defendant was only an incidental one. 5' The satisfaction the defendant obtained in having his request complied with was insufficient
to raise an obligation to pay for the services. The net result of the
decision was that the defendant had received the very act he desired
and had been relieved of the moral obligation to care for his sister
without incurring any expense. The plaintiff, who had performed
valuable services, was left without a remedy.
Bristol v. Sutton,52 decided in Michigan, involved an emancipated
boy of 15 who had returned home to help his father with the farm on
the faith of an uncle's oral promise to provide for the boy by will.
Since the direct benefit of the boy's services went to the father,
recovery against the uncle's estate was denied. 53 Here again the
3 A. CoRmmx, CONTRACTS § 599, at 599 n.22 (1960).
44 41 Utah 404, 125 P. 860 (1912).
45 Id. at 410, 125 P. at 862.
46 26 MitcH. L. REv. 942, 943 (1928).
47 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment b (1937).
48 3 A. CoTRn7, supra note 41.
43

49

14 Cal. 2d 605, 95 P.2d 927 (1939).

50 Id. at 607, 95 P.2d at 929.

51 Id. at 612, 95 P.2d at 931.
52 115 Mich. 365, 73 N.W.424 (1897).
53 Id. at 368, 73 N.W.at 426.
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defendant had received the performance he had bargained for and
yet was not required to pay.
In both the Rotea and the Bristol cases the services were performed for a third person but upon the defendant's specific request.

Bristol was decided 30 years before the Restatement of Restitution,
but Rotea came down thereafter and failed to take cognizance of
the provision making the request sufficient to satisfy the benefit requirement. 54 Had the courts in the above two decisions been willing
to accept the proposition that the request constituted the benefit,
or had they considered the presence or absence of a benefit as only
evidence to be weighed with other factors, the harsh results could
have been avoided. What is needed is either a more liberal approach
to the requirement of a benefit or a new rule with a broader basis
for recovery. The latter is the better solution, since it would provide
for a more uniform application and would dispense with the necessity
of resorting to fictions. 55

Unjust Enrichment or Unconscionable Loss
It is submitted that there should be a dual basis for recovery in
quasi-contract: the prevention of either an unjust enrichment of the
defendant or an unconscionable loss to the plaintiff. 50 Attention
should be focused on the equities of the case, or the grounds for relief, rather than on the form the benefit assumes. 57 With this approach the presence of a benefit,58 the request by the defendant, the
expectation of payment on the part of the plaintiff, and the knowledge of that expectation on the part of the defendant all become
matters of evidence59 to be considered by the court in determining
whether the gain or loss was an unjust one and on whose shoulders
See text accompanying note 47 supra.
55 "One may disagree that the straining of logic to feign a contract is a
'more specific and therefore less vague inquiry than to ask is it fair that the
54

defendant should make a payment to the plaintiff,' . . . and may well con-

sider that the disadvantages attendant on the law being influenced by rival
philosophies of justice are slight, compared to the disadvantages of a common law inhibited by antiquated fictions in its capacity to expand." O'Connell, supra note 36, at 9.
56 This is the rule in situations where the plaintiff's property has beeni
wrongfully converted. He may recover in restitution even against an. innocent converter who has received no net benefit, the theory being that an
unjust loss to the plaintiff is avoided. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128,
comment f (1937).
57

J. DAwsoN, UNJUST EmNucmrmNT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23 (1951).

58 Roman law, the origin of the principle of unjust enrichment, did not
require a benefit in some situations.- The French Civil Code recognizes the,
doctrine of unjust enrichment in only four specific situations under quasicontractual remedies.

See Newman, The Cleft: The Similarity of Funda-

mental -Doctrinesof Law Which Underlies Their Conceptual Formulation in
Different Legal Systems, 18 HASTNGs L.J. 481, 525 (1967). Even where unjust
enrichment is the basis, the French judges have more discretion in that the
enrichment need not be directly at the plaintiff's expense. F. LAWSON, A
CO nvoN LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CivrL LAw 159 (1953).
5 Cf. Williams v. Dougan, 175 Cal. App. 2d 414, 418, 346 P.2d 241, 244
(1959).
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the burden should rest.60 This rule facilitates placing the loss on the
party who was at fault.
The Kentucky decision in Boone v. Coe 6 well-illustrates the
necessity of a change in the requirements for recovery in quasi-

contract. In that case the defendant had orally promised to lease
certain land to the plaintiff if the latter would move his family
from Kentucky to Texas, enter upon the land and cultivate crops for
one year. The plaintiff incurred great expense in moving his family and belongings but when he got to Texas the defendant repudiated the agreement. In an action to recover the moving expenses, a
demurrer to the plaintiff's petition was sustained because those expenditures had not benefited the defendant. Again, it was the Statute
of Frauds that precluded an action upon the contract. 62 While it
is well-settled that the Statute is no defense to suits on contracts
implied in law, 63 the necessity of a benefit and the court's inability to
64
find one prevented the plaintiff from recovering in quasi-contract.
If the court had instead been willing to imply a contract in law to
prevent unconscionable injury to the plaintiff, the Statute of Frauds
would have been inapplicable. While it might be argued that a more
liberal rule for recovery in quasi-contract would defeat the purpose
of the Statute, the purpose of the Statute is to prevent fraud rather
65
than to foster it.

The fact that the expenditures made by the plaintiff in Boone
were in preparation for performance makes the case analogous to
those involving contracts for the manufacture of a product, as in
Coleman. In both types of cases the expenditures or services are
merely incidental to full performance. Because with personal service contracts the service is the complete act requested, it has been
easier for the courts to find a "legal" or "implied" benefit, 66 or to
disregard-the requirement altogether. 67 It might be that the natural
tendency is to be more sympathetic toward the individual laborer,
therefore the courts consider the moral obligation to pay stronger
where personal services are involved. But these seem to be inadequate reasons for making a distinction between the two types of
cases, as to grounds for recovery. The moral obligation is just as
strong in any case where the plaintiff might suffer an unconscionable
injury at the hands of the defendant. In both Boone and Coleman
the expenses incurred and the services performed, although not the
60 See Coleman Eng'ring Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396,
420, 420 P.2d 713, 729, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 17 (1966) (dissenting opinion), discussed
in text accompanying note 10 supra.
61 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (1913).
62 Id. at 239, 154 S.W. at 903.
63 Beard v. Melvin, 60 Cal. App. 2d 421, 426, 140 P.2d 720, 723 (1943); see
Dondero v. Aparicio, 63 Cal. App. 373, 378, 218 P. 608, 609 (1923); 23 CAL.
Jup. 2d, Statute'of Frauds §§ 30, 53, 76 (1955); Annot., 101 A.L.R. 923, 931
(1936); cf. Anderson v. Stansburg, 38 Cal. 2d 707, 715-16, 242 P.2d 305, 310
(1952); Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 604, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25, 33
(1966).
64 153 Ky. at 239, 154 S.W. at 903.
65 See Huey v. Frank, 182 Ill. App. 431, 435-36 (1913).
66 See 26 MIcK. L. REV. 942, 943 (1928).
67 See, e.g., Huey v. Frank, 182 ll. App. 431 (1913).
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essence of the agreements, were consequences of the defendant's request and the plaintiff's reliance on a supposed contract. It is therefore equitable to compel the defendant to restore the plaintiff to his
original position.
Conclusion
The well-settled rule that a benefit must have been conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff in order to recover in quasicontract has produced undesirable results. To avoid such results some
courts have either disregarded the requirement of a benefit or have
used a fictional benefit to grant relief. This relaxation of the rule
has been confined to cases on personal service contracts.
There is no reason, other than historical accident, for unjust enrichment being the only grounds for recovery in quasi-contract. Nor
is there a reasonable basis for distinguishing personal service contracts from contracts for the manufacture of a product in formulating a rule of recovery.
It is suggested that by broadening the basis of quasi-contractual
recovery to include the prevention of unconscionable injury of the
plaintiff, equitable results might be reached in a more forthright
manner. The elements of benefit, request, expectation of payment,
and knowledge of the plaintiff's expectation of payment would all
be factors to be considered by the court in determining the defendant's liability.
Professor Corbin has remarked: "Judges like all other men, find
it difficult to escape from the mental habits and procedural ruts of
the past."6 But not all judges fit into that category. Chief Justice
Traynor has taken the course prescribed by Lord Atkins: "When
these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their
medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through
them undeterred." 69
Robert B. Hutchinson*
68 5 A. Coamw, supra note 41, § 1102, at 459 n.2.
69 United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, 29.
* Member, Second Year Class.

